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Dreaming and psychosis share important features, such as intrinsic sense perceptions
independent of external stimulation, and a general lack of criticism that is associated
with reduced frontal cerebral activity. Awareness of dreaming while a dream is happening
defines lucid dreaming (LD), a state in which the prefrontal cortex is more active than
during regular dreaming. For this reason, LD has been proposed to be potentially
therapeutic for psychotic patients. According to this view, psychotic patients would
be expected to report LD less frequently, and with lower control ability, than healthy
subjects. Furthermore, psychotic patients able to experience LD should present milder
psychiatric symptoms, in comparison with psychotic patients unable to experience LD.
To test these hypotheses, we investigated LD features (occurrence, control abilities,
frequency, and affective valence) and psychiatric symptoms (measure by PANSS, BPRS,
and automated speech analysis) in 45 subjects with psychotic symptoms [25 with
Schizophrenia (S) and 20 with Bipolar Disorder (B) diagnosis] versus 28 non-psychotic
control (C) subjects. Psychotic lucid dreamers reported control of their dreams more
frequently (67% of S and 73% of B) than non-psychotic lucid dreamers (only 23%
of C; S > C with p = 0.0283, B > C with p = 0.0150). Importantly, there was no
clinical advantage for lucid dreamers among psychotic patients, even for the diagnostic
question specifically related to lack of judgment and insight. Despite some limitations
(e.g., transversal design, large variation of medications), these preliminary results
support the notion that LD is associated with psychosis, but falsify the hypotheses that
we set out to test. A possible explanation is that psychosis enhances the experience of
internal reality in detriment of external reality, and therefore lucid dreamers with psychotic
symptoms would be more able to control their internal reality than non-psychotic lucid
dreamers. Training dream lucidity is likely to produce safe psychological strengthening
in a non-psychotic population, but in a psychotic population LD practice may further
empower deliria and hallucinations, giving internal reality the appearance of external
reality.
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INTRODUCTION
Dreaming and psychosis share important phenomenological and
neurophysiological features (Gottesmann, 2005; Manoach and
Stickgold, 2009; Mota-Rolim and Araujo, 2013; Dresler et al.,
2014). In terms of subjective experience, both phenomena present
intrinsic sense perceptions independent of external stimulation,
associated with a lack of criticism (or rational judgment)
regarding the bizarreness of these experiences (Cicogna and
Bosinelli, 2001). The latter feature has been hypothesized to stem
from the decrease in frontal cerebral activity that characterizes
both psychosis and rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep (Dresler
et al., 2014; Voss et al., 2014). Yet, executive functions are not
necessarily impaired during dreaming. It is possible to be aware
of dreaming while a dream is happening, with partial or total
control of the dream contents by the dreamer, a phenomenon
called lucid dreaming (LD; Laberge et al., 1986; Mota-Rolim
and Araujo, 2013; Stumbrys et al., 2013; Voss et al., 2014).
Recent studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(Dresler et al., 2012) and electroencephalography (Voss et al.,
2009) indicate that LD is related to increased activity in the
prefrontal cortex (Voss et al., 2009, 2014; Mota-Rolim et al., 2010;
Neider et al., 2011; Dresler et al., 2012; Stumbrys et al., 2013). In
agreement with this notion, transcranial electrical stimulation of
the prefrontal cortex can induce dream awareness during REM
sleep (Stumbrys et al., 2013; Voss et al., 2014). Frontal cortex
activity correlates with self-consciousness, working memory,
and attention (Postle, 2006). Therefore, an increase in frontal
activity should contribute to lucidity during dreaming (Hobson,
2009; Voss et al., 2009), while a decrease in prefrontal activity
should explain the lack of rational judgment in both psychosis
and non-lucid dreams (Anticevic et al., 2012; Dresler et al.,
2014).
Theories about human consciousness propose that the LD
phenomenon is possible due to the linguistic ability of our
species, which permits the semantic access of episodic memories
of sensory origin (Edelman, 2003; Voss et al., 2013). By
accessing episodic memories, the flow of thoughts can be
reported, and the subjective ability of “mind wandering” can
be shared with others. Similarly, dream mentation can be
understood as spontaneous thinking, not associated to any
external task (Fox et al., 2013). An important set of systems
involved in this process is the default mode network (DMN),
a functional circuit comprising brain areas activated during
resting states, and suppressed during cognitive tasks (Anticevic
et al., 2012; Fox et al., 2013). Some core DMN areas are also
engaged during REM sleep, such as the medial pre-frontal
cortex and multiple temporal structures (parahippocampal,
hippocampal, and entorhinal cortices; Fox et al., 2013). In
patients with schizophrenia, there is an impairment in DMN
suppression during attention tasks that may contribute to the
cognitive deficits found in these subjects (Anticevic et al.,
2012).
The dream experience is also peculiar for psychotic patients.
Dream report analysis reveals a higher frequency of nightmares
among schizophrenic patients than in healthy subjects (Okorome
Mume, 2009; Michels et al., 2014), with more hostile contents,
higher proportion of strangers among the dream characters, and
a lower frequency of dreams in which the dreamer is the main
character (Skancke et al., 2014). We have recently uncovered
evidence of language impairments in the dream reports of
schizophrenic subjects, who produce substantially less complex
narratives than non-schizophrenic subjects (Mota et al., 2014).
Using a graph-theoretical approach to represent and quantify
word trajectories, we found that the recurrence, connectivity
and global complexity of dream reports characterize the distinct
patterns of thought disorder that correspond to schizophrenia
and bipolar disorder type I, two different diseases associated
with psychosis (Mota et al., 2012, 2014). Interestingly, graph
connectivity attributes were strongly correlated with negative
and cognitive symptoms among psychotic patients (Mota et al.,
2014). In other words, psychosis-related cognitive deficits are
accompanied by impairment in the ability to share a flow of
thoughts when remembering a dream, leading to less connected
reports than those produced by healthy subjects. Notably, these
differences were more prominent for dream reports than for
waking reports (Mota et al., 2014). A likely explanation is
the hypo-function of the prefrontal cortex in psychosis, which
resembles the reduction of prefrontal cortex activity during
REM sleep in healthy subjects, in comparison to the levels
found in waking. Both in psychosis and regular dreaming,
prefrontal cortex hypo-function seems to be causally related to
the decreased criticism typical of these states (Dresler et al., 2014;
Laruelle, 2014). Since LD displays increased frontal activity in
comparison with non-LD (Mota-Rolim et al., 2010; Stumbrys
et al., 2013; Voss et al., 2014), LD has been proposed as potential
therapy for psychotic patients (Dresler et al., 2014; Voss et al.,
2014).
Despite the large amount of evidence linking sleep and
dreaming to psychosis (Gottesmann, 2005; Manoach and
Stickgold, 2009; Mota-Rolim and Araujo, 2013; Dresler et al.,
2014), there is a lack of quantitative information regarding
dreaming in psychotic patients. In particular, there are simply no
studies of LD in psychotic patients. To address these gaps, we set
out to quantitatively characterize LD in a psychotic sample, using
graph-theoretical tools and standard psychiatric instruments to
test three hypotheses: (1) Psychotic patients report LD less
frequently than non-psychotic subjects; (2) Psychotic patients
report LD control less frequently than non-psychotic subjects;
and (3) Psychotic patients who experience LD present attenuated
psychiatric symptoms and present less thought disorder, in
comparison with psychotic patients who do not experience LD.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Seventy-three Brazilian individuals (43 males and 22 females,
mean age 35.59 ± 10.92 years), comprising 28 subjects without
psychotic symptoms (control group – C), 25 patients diagnosed
with schizophrenia (S), and 20 patients diagnosed with bipolar
disorder type I (B), for a total of 45 medicated patients with
psychotic symptoms (Table 1). The study was approved by
the UFRN Research Ethics Committee (permit#102/06-98244),
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TABLE 1 | Socio-demographic and psychiatric information about the groups investigated.
Psychotic subjects Control subjects P-value
Schizophrenia Bipolar S × B S × C B × C
Demographic characteristics
Age Years 34 ± 9.55 39.05 ± 11.79 34.79 ± 11.25 0.1342 0.8369 0.2910
Sex Male 84% 65% 61% 0.1406 0.0603 0.7624
Female 16% 35% 39%
Education Years 6.92 ± 4.02 9.35 ± 4.20 8.79 ± 3.94 0.0592 0.0867 0.7232
Marital status Married 24% 50% 60% 0.0702 0.0071∗∗ 0.4607
Previously Married 20% 30% 8% 0.4380 0.1676 0.0362∗
Never Married 56% 20% 32% 0.0143∗ 0.0802 0.3507
Psychiatric assesment
Medication Typical
Antipsychotic
72% 65% 0 0.6143 0.0000∗∗ 0.0000∗∗
Atypical
Antipsychotic
36% 20% 0 0.2393 0.0027∗∗ 0.0350∗
Mood Stabilizer 12% 55% 5% 0.0020∗∗ 0.4123 0.0006∗∗
Benzodiazepine 28% 30% 15% 0.8831 0.2973 0.2560
Antidepressants 0% 20% 20% 0.0191∗ 0.0191∗ 1
Age of onset Years 22.84 ± 8.27 27.1 ± 9.73 36.8 ± 8.9 0.1013 0.0101∗ 0.0569
Disease duration Months 17.32 ± 12.10 12.45 ± 9.98 1.24 ± 1.57 0.2162 0.0011∗∗ 0.0042∗∗
Age (years), years of education, frequency of sex, marital status, and medication for the groups studied. Mean and standard deviation are indicated. All subjects were
Brazilian. Control subjects were non-psychotic individuals with depression (N= 5), generalized anxiety disorder (N= 2), one past episode of post-traumatic stress disorder
(N = 1), various symptoms of mood/anxiety disorder without reaching diagnostic criteria (N = 11), plus nine healthy individuals. The groups were compared in pairs using
the chi-square test for sex, marital status, and medication, and the Wilcoxon Ranksum test for age, years of education, age of onset, and disease duration. P-values are
described for each pair comparison (∗p < 0.05 and ∗∗p < 0.01).
and the data were collected by convenience sampling at the
“Onofre Lopes” and “João Machado” Hospitals. The control
group was recruited at the same clinical institutions among
subjects presenting anxiety or depression symptoms but without
a psychiatric diagnosis (N = 11), among psychiatric patients
without psychotic symptoms [individuals with depression
(N = 5), generalized anxiety disorder (N = 2), one past
episode of post-traumatic stress disorder (N = 1)] and healthy
individuals accompanying patients (N = 9). All individuals
gave written informed consent. During the psychiatric interview,
patients were examined for major changes in state and
level of consciousness (e.g., drowsiness, torpor), for signs of
autopsychic and allopsychic disorientation (e.g., inability to
remember name, age, spatial localization), and for signs of
reduced mnemonic and cognitive capacity. All psychotic subjects
were medicated and out of the acute psychotic phase at the
onset of the study, so typically they were in good capacity
to provide informed consent. When signs of disorientation or
reduced mnemonic capacity were detected, the experimenter
also obtained written informed consent on their behalf from
their legal guardians (next of kin). There were differences
related to marital status (more single subject on S than on
B, previously married on B than on C and more married
subjects on C than on S – which could be explained by
social behavior impairments in the psychotic group), medication
(more antipsychotics for psychotic groups, more mood stabilizers
for B and less antidepressants for S – which reflects the
clinical symptoms treated), the age of onset and the duration
(smaller age of onset for S compared to C, and larger
duration to psychotic group – also expected for the different
diseases). Those differences mostly reflect the epidemiological
features of a psychotic population within a regular clinical
setting.
Instruments
Diagnosis was obtained with SCID DSM IV (First et al., 1990),
followed by application of the psychometric scales PANSS (Kay
et al., 1987) and BPRS (Bech et al., 1986). We used all the 48
symptoms measured by both scales (30 symptoms measured by
PANSS, grades of severity from 1 until 7; and 18 symptoms
measured by BPRS, grades of severity from 0 until 3). Next a
dream report was requested. Specifically, we asked the subject to
report the most recent dream they could remember, followed by
questions about regular dreaming (translated from Portuguese:
“Do your dreams usually resemble your daily life?,” “Do your
dreams usually resemble your psychotic symptoms?,” and “Do your
dreams change following changes in medication?”), and also about
LD (“Can you be aware of dreaming during sleep?,” “Can you
control your dream when this happens?,” “How frequently does
this happen: Once in lifetime, more than once but less than 10
times, more than 10 times but less than 100 times, or more than
100 times?,” “How do you feel when you wake up from these
dreams: very good, good, bad or very bad?”). We considered as
lucid dreamers individuals that claimed to be aware of dreaming
during a dream at least once in lifetime. All the verbal reports
were digitally recorded and transcribed. Analysis: The chi-square
test was used to establish statistically significant differences
between groups (S, B, and C) on questions about LD, and between
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TABLE 2 | Speech graph attributes (SGA): detail description of each speech graph attribute measured from dream reports.
N: Number of nodes.
E: Number of edges.
RE (Repeated Edges): sum of all edges linking the same pair of nodes.
PE (Parallel Edges): sum of all parallel edges linking the same pair of nodes given that the source node of an edge is the target node of the parallel edge.
L1 (Loop of one node): sum of all edges linking a node with itself, calculated as the trace of the adjacency matrix.
L2 (Loop of two nodes): sum of all loops containing two nodes, calculated by the trace of the squared adjacency matrix divided by two.
L3 (Loop of three nodes): sum of all loops containing three nodes (triangles), calculated by the trace of the cubed adjacency matrix divided by three.
LCC (Largest Connected Component): number of nodes in the maximal subgraph in which all pairs of nodes are reachable from one another in the
underlying undirected subgraph.
LSC (Largest Strongly Connected Component): number of nodes in the maximal subgraph in which all pairs of nodes are reachable from one another in the
directed subgraph (node a reaches node b, and b reaches a).
ATD (Average Total Degree): given a node n, the Total Degree is the sum of “in and out” edges. Average Total Degree is the sum of Total Degree of all nodes
divided by the number of nodes.
Density: number of edges divided by possible edges. [D = 2∗E/N∗(N – 1)], where E is the number of edges and N is the number of nodes.
Diameter: length of the longest shortest path between the node pairs of a network.
Average Shortest Path (ASP): average length of the shortest path between pairs of nodes of a network.
CC (Average Clustering Coefficient): given a node n, the Clustering Coefficient Map (CCMap) is the set of fractions of all n neighbors that are also neighbors
of each other. Average CC is the sum of the Clustering Coefficients of all nodes in the CCMap divided by number of elements in the CCMap.
lucid dreamers and non-lucid dreamers (within groups S and B)
on questions about regular dreams.
Graph Analysis
Thought disorder was investigated by representing the verbal
reports of experimental and control subjects as directed graphs.
These were computed by the custom-made free software Speech
Graphs (http://www.neuro.ufrn.br/softwares/speechgraphs),
which allows the calculation of several attributes related to the
recurrence, connectivity, and global complexity of graphs (Mota
et al., 2014). This methodology is free of subjective bias, since
it does not take into account any personal evaluation of the
semantic content of the verbal reports. Rather, it mathematically
analyzes various structural aspects of the reports. We have
previously validated this methodology for the diagnosis of
psychosis (Mota et al., 2012, 2014) and dementia (Bertola et al.,
2014). The rationale for combining the use of psychometric
scales and speech graph analysis was to quantitatively analyze
the psychiatric symptoms, so as to compare groups of lucid
and non-lucid psychotic dreamers and better characterize their
mental functioning. A graph is a mathematical representation
of a network with nodes linked by edges, formally defined as
G = (N, E), with the set of nodes N = {w1, w2, . . ., wn} and the
set of edges E = {(wi,wj)} (Mota et al., 2012, 2014; Bertola et al.,
2014). A speech graph represents the sequential relationship of
spoken words in a verbal report, with each word represented as
a node, and the sequence between successive words represented
as a directed edge (Mota et al., 2012, 2014; Bertola et al., 2014).
A total of 14 speech graph attributes (SGA) were calculated
for each dream report, comprising general graph attributes
(N, total of nodes; E, total of edges), recurrence (PE, parallel
edges; RE, repeated edges; L1, L2, and L3, loops of one; two and
three nodes), connectivity (LCC, largest connected component
and LSC, largest strongly connected component) and global
attributes (ATD, average total degree; Density, Diameter; ASP,
average shortest path; CC, clustering coefficient; Table 2).
The non-parametric statistical test Wilcoxon Ranksum was
used to establish SGA differences between lucid dreamers and
non-lucid dreamers, as well as differences in the symptomatology
measured by psychometric scales and speech measures (corrected
for the number of symptoms and speech attributes by the
Bonferroni method, α = 0.0008). Effect size was measured by
Cohen’s d.
RESULTS
About half of the psychotic subjects (48% of S and 55% of B)
and 46% of C reported having at least one LD in life, but we
found no statistically significant difference among the groups S
versus B (p = 0.6407), S versus C (p = 0.3138), or B versus
C (p = 0.5582; Figure 1A). Psychotic lucid dreamers reported
control of their dreams more frequently (67% of S and 73% of
B) than non-psychotic lucid dreamers (only 23% of C; S versus
C p = 0.0283, B versus C p = 0.0150; Figure 1B). There was
no statistical difference among groups concerning the number
of lifetime LD episodes (33% of S, 55% of B, and 31% of
C reported having had more than 10 LD in life; S versus B
p = 0.3053, S versus C p = 0.8908, B versus C p = 0.2391;
Figure 1C), nor for the proportion of subjects that reported
feeling good after waking up from a LD (58% of S, 91% of B,
and 77% of C; S versus B p = 0.0755, S versus C p = 0.3195,
B versus C p = 0.3596; Figure 1D). Specifically regarding lucid
dreamers in the psychotic groups, 57% of those that were unable
to control LD, and 81% of those that claimed to control LD,
reported pleasant feelings after waking from a LD (no statistical
difference between lucid dreamers that control the dream and
lucid dreamers that do not control the dream on S and B groups,
p= 0.2257).
A possible confounding factor to interpret the higher fre-
quency of dream control in the psychotic groups is the use
of antipsychotic medications. Neurons in the prefrontal cortex
are among the main targets of antipsychotics, via modulation
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FIGURE 1 | Characteristics of lucid dream reports in schizophrenia (S), bipolar (B), and control (C) groups. (A) Percentage of each group reporting
occurrence of lucid dreaming at least once in a lifetime. (B) Percentage of the ability to control their dreams: psychotic groups report control ability more frequently
than control group (S vs. C: p = 0.0283, B vs. C: p = 0.0150). (C) Percentage of high frequency of lucid dreams (more than 10 lucid dreams in a lifetime).
(D) Percentage of positive affective valence (good feeling after wake up from a lucid dream) (∗p < 0.05).
of the prefrontal cortex output to basal ganglia circuits
(Monti and Monti, 2004; Merikangas et al., 2011). First
generation antipsychotics enhance total sleep time and sleep
efficiency by controlling psychotic symptoms, but there are no
consistent results in non-psychotic subjects. Second generation
antipsychotics increase total sleep time and sleep efficiency in
both psychotic and non-psychotic subjects, with some drugs
having specific effects on sleep patterns (e.g., olanzapine increases
the amount of the N2 stage of sleep; Monti and Monti, 2004;
Cohrs, 2008). To investigate this effect in our psychotic sample,
we compared the doses of antipsychotics (chlorpromazine-
equivalent) between lucid and non-lucid dreamers. Within lucid
dreamers, we compared the antipsychotic doses administered
to those that reported to control LD to the doses administered
to those who reported not to control their dreams. Neither
comparison showed statistically significant differences (lucid
versus non-lucid dreamers p = 0.5460, and control versus non-
control p = 0.8556), thus strengthening the conclusion that the
differences between psychotic and control groups concerning the
ability to control LD are related to the psychotic state, not to the
different medications used.
Among psychotic patients, lucid dreamers reported
similarities between dreams and daily life more frequently
than non-lucid dreamers (for B: 73% of lucid dreamers and 22%
of non-lucid dreamers, p = 0.0246; for S: 94% of lucid dreamers
and 69% of non-lucid dreamers, p= 0.0596; Figure 2). Following
changes in medication, lucid dreamers were much more likely to
report changes in dream content (100% of B and 92% of S) than
non-lucid dreamers (0% of B, and 8% of S; p = 0.0000 on S and
B; Figure 2). Figure 2 also shows that there was no difference
concerning the similarity of dreams and symptoms between
lucid (55% of B, and 58% of S) and non-lucid (44% of B, and 38%
of S; p= 0.3204 on S and p= 0.6531 on B) dreamers.
With regard to the application of standard psychometric
scales and speech quantitative analysis, we did not find any
difference between lucid and non-lucid dreamer patients, neither
in S nor in B groups after correction for multiple comparisons
(α = 0.0008). We failed to detect any clinical advantage for lucid
dreamers even when multiple comparisons were disregarded
(α = 0.05), even for the item G12 on PANSS, related to the
symptom “Lack of judgment and insight.” This means that the
psychotic patients that were more able to have insight during
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FIGURE 2 | Characteristics of regular dream reports among psychotic
patients. (A) Within the S group, there were no significant differences
between lucid dreamers and non-lucid dreamers concerning similarities
between dream and daily experiences, but lucid dreamers reported changes
on dream contents after changes on medication more frequently than
non-lucid dreamers (p < 0.00005). (B) In the B group, lucid dreamers
reported similarities between dream and daily experiences, as well as changes
on dreams after medication changes, more frequently than non-lucid
dreamers (p = 0.0246 and p < 0.00005, respectively). Neither S nor B
showed differences between lucid and non-lucid dreamers on reports about
similarities between dreams and psychotic symptoms (∗p < 0.05).
dreaming were not more able to have insight about their own
psychotic reality than patients that were less aware during
dreaming. On the contrary, the emotional retraction symptom
measured by item N2 of the PANSS Negative Subscale, (Kay
et al., 1987) was more prevalent in lucid dreamers than in non-
lucid dreamers among S [Figure 3 and Supplementary Table 1;
LD versus non-LD on S: p = 0.0329, mean ± SD non-lucid
(n = 13): 2.54 ± 1.28 lucid (n = 12): 3.75 ± 1.36; Cohen’s
d: –0.92, a large effect size]. This symptom is characterized by
the lack of interest in external events, with little involvement
or affective commitment. Likewise, with regard to the structural
features of speech, only in S we found that lucid dreamers
displayed a significantly different SGA, namely smaller clustering
coefficient [CC; p = 0.0171, mean ± SD non-lucid (n = 13):
0.065 ± 0.047 lucid (n = 12): 0.030 ± 0.037; Cohen’s d: 0.83,
a large effect size] in comparison with non-lucid dreamers
(Figure 4 and Supplementary Table 2). This means that lucid
dreamers in the S group produced less complex speech graphs
when reporting a regular dream, in comparison with S subjects
that were not lucid dreamers, reflecting a less complex flow of
thought.
DISCUSSION
Altogether, the results falsified the three hypotheses that we
set out to test. First, psychotic patients did not report LD
less frequently than non-psychotic subjects. Second, among
the subjects that reported being lucid dreamers, psychotic
patients reported LD control more frequently than non-psychotic
subjects. Finally, patients who reported LD did not present
attenuated psychiatric symptoms, in comparison with patients
who did not report LD. Indeed, schizophrenia patients that
qualified as lucid dreamers showed a tendency to be more, not
less symptomatic than non-lucid dreamers in the same group.
Therefore, although the results on the lifetime occurrence of
LD replicate prior data (Snyder and Gackenbach, 1988; Mota-
Rolim et al., 2013), we could not find support for the notion that
a psychotic sample would report less LD than a non-psychotic
sample. There was no difference between psychotic and non-
psychotic subjects regarding the number of LD events in life. As
previously detected in a non-psychotic sample (Voss et al., 2013),
we found positive emotions to be more frequently associated with
LD in all groups, without significant differences.
In a sample of 3,427 Brazilian subjects interviewed online, 29%
of the subjects reported the ability to control LD (Mota-Rolim
et al., 2013). In the present study, only 23% of the non-psychotic
sample reported LD control, in contrast with significantly larger
numbers among psychotic subjects (67% of S and 73% of B).
This result was unexpected, considering that non-psychotic lucid
dreamers show increased control of internal reality (Blagrove
and Tucker, 1994; Blagrove and Hartnell, 2000), being more
frequently able to regulate cognition and emotion than non-lucid
dreamers (Blagrove and Hartnell, 2000). A possible explanation
is that psychosis enhances the experience of the internal reality
in detriment of the external reality, and therefore lucid dreamers
with psychotic symptoms would be more able to control
their internal reality than non-psychotic lucid dreamers. If
we hypothesize that the positive symptoms of psychosis may
represent the intrusion of REM sleep mentation into waking
(Freud, 1900; Dzirasa et al., 2006; Dresler et al., 2014), and that
LD may reflect the intrusion of waking mentation into REM
sleep (Mota-Rolim and Araujo, 2013), subjects who frequently
experience both conditions may be more cognitively trained to
control their internal reality than those who rarely experience LD.
This line of reasoning is supported by the fact that lucid dreamers
with psychotic symptoms reported more similarity between
dreams and daily life than non-lucid dreamers with psychotic
symptoms. Lucid dreamers were also much more likely than non-
lucid dreamers to report changes in dream content following
changes in medication, possibly reflecting a higher awareness
of dream reality in the former. Indeed, the frequent experience
of REM sleep-like mentations into the waking life might train
control of internal reality, and thus explain higher control of lucid
dream in psychotic patients. This might be particularly true for
transition phases between acutely psychotic and non-psychotic
phases. Within the dreaming/psychosis model, such transition
phases might thus be considered as “pre-lucid.” Future studies
should consider a longitudinal design, and aim to characterize the
transition between acute and non-acute psychotic phases.
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FIGURE 3 | Psychometric differences between lucid dreamers and non-lucid dreamers among schizophrenia patients. (A) Boxplots showing total BPRS
of lucid dreamers and non-lucid dreamers in the S group (p = 0.5930). (B) Boxplots showing total PANSS of lucid dreamers and non-lucid dreamers in the S group
(p = 0.6434). (C) Among S subjects, lucid dreamers showed higher scores on PANSS item N2 about emotional retraction (p = 0.0329), without significant
differences for the other symptoms; no significant differences were found among B subjects (see Supplementary Table 1) (∗p < 0.05).
FIGURE 4 | Differences on speech structure when reporting a regular dream between lucid dreamers and non-lucid dreamers among schizophrenia
patients. (A) Example of a text (regular dream report) represented as a speech graph. For this plot the original text was in Portuguese and each word was translated
to English, preserving the original grammatical structure. Speech graph attributes (SGA, see Table 2) were used to characterize speech structure from dream
reports. (B) In the S group, speech graphs from dream reports of lucid dreamers showed smaller clustering coefficient (CC) than non-lucid dreamers (p = 0.0171)
(∗p < 0.05).
We found no clinical advantages of having LD with regard
to psychiatric symptomatology, to speech structure, and in
particular to criticism of reality [question G12 of PANSS (Kay
et al., 1987), Supplementary Table 1]. On the contrary, we
found that lucid dreamers in the S group tends to be more
emotionally retracted than non-lucid dreamers, which means
that they were more isolated from others. These subjects also
tended to report their regular dreams in a less clustered manner,
reflecting a decrease in the complexity of the flow of thought
when reporting a dream, a symptom related to cognitive and
negative severity in schizophrenia (Mota et al., 2014), and
with cognitive impairment in dementia (Bertola et al., 2014).
Although these results do not reach significance after Bonferroni
correction, they have a large effect size that should not be
neglected. Possibly if the number of subjects per group was
higher, these symptomatology differences would become clearer.
Taken together, both psychometric features reveal impairment
of social behavior and thought disorganization among lucid
dreamers in the S group, which could be considered a potential
disadvantage related to clinical severity. But considering that
those lucid dreamers tend to control dream contents more
frequently, we can also interpret this result as a compensatory
attempt to enhance dream control, rather than trying the more
difficult control of reality. Do changes in dream control precede
changes in reality control, or vice-versa? While the transversal
design employed here cannot answer this question, future
longitudinal studies should help to disentangle these alternatives,
by synchronously collecting data on insights about dreaming and
psychotic reality, to determine the order of occurrence of changes
in these states.
Our study has other limitations that need to be considered.
First, sample sizes were relatively small, reflecting the scarcity of
individuals that experience both psychotic symptoms and LD.
The prevalence of LD (considering the definition adopted in
this study) is high in the Brazilian population (77.2%; Mota-
Rolim et al., 2013) and was not found to be low in our sample
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(48% in S, 55% in B, and 46% in C), but the prevalence of
psychosis is much lower (B prevalence data from 11 countries:
0.6%; Merikangas et al., 2011, S prevalence data from 46
countries: 0.55%; McGrath et al., 2008). We also had differences
between the groups that mostly reflect general epidemiological
differences regarding marital status within psychotic populations,
but should be considered as a potential confounding factor.
In addition, the control sample (subjects without psychotic
symptoms in lifetime) had a mixture of individuals with and
without psychiatric symptoms, some with psychiatric diagnosis
like depression and others without any psychiatric symptom in
lifetime, what make this control group very heterogeneous; in
future studies a control sample without any psychiatric symptoms
should be investigated.
Another caveat is the fact that the research was only based
on self-reports of LD, with possible confounds of secondary
elaboration, motivation, conscious and unconscious intentions
(Freud, 1900). Ideally lucidity should be assessed by external
judges to avoid fallacious interpretations (Stumbrys et al.,
2012). Moreover, we assessed LD throughout the lifetime, but
did not investigate whether the patients experienced lucid
dreams specifically during the psychotic episode(s). This is an
important issue to be clarified in future studies, specifically when
considering symptomatology differences, such as the increase
of insight. Maybe the patients that were considered as lucid
dreamers in the present study were not experiencing lucid
dreams during that period, and would not show potential clinical
advantages such as increased insight.
Medication was another limitation to consider (Table 1),
since all the psychotic subjects were medicated with a variety of
different drugs, and the use of psychotropic drugs can modify
dream perception and recall (Solms, 2000; Gottesmann, 2005).
Future studies should also interview psychotic patients during
acute crises, to compare with the data collected during non-acute
states as in the present study. In principle, data sampled during
acute phases should be more informative. The symptomatology
during this transition phase (acute to non-acute phase) should
give important information regarding changes in insight of the
differences between fantasy and reality.
Furthermore, we did not control for differences in dream
recall frequency among the patients, an important methodo-
logical issue for dream research (Schredl, 2011; Michels et al.,
2014; Skancke et al., 2014), which could perhaps explain the
differences in continuity between daily life and dreams, or
changes of dream content after change of medication. In addition,
we did not control for differences in the frequency of nightmares,
which is heightened in S patients (Okorome Mume, 2009;
Michels et al., 2014; Skancke et al., 2014), and may be related with
lucidity in pathological conditions (Rak et al., 2015). However,
nightmares are by definition associated with unpleasant feelings
after waking up, and we found a high frequency of pleasant
feelings after waking up from a lucid dream in this sample (58%
for S and 91% for B). Finally, we did not employ training or
induction techniques for LD generation (Stumbrys et al., 2012),
but rather dealt with natural recollections of spontaneous LD.
The results in trained subjects may be quite different from those
reported here. Beyond these limitations, our results suggest that
psychotic lucid dreamers, which fail the “external reality test,”
are nevertheless more able to control their internal reality during
dreaming.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the
first to assess LD in a clinically characterized psychotic
sample. Overall the results confirm the notion that LD
is associated with psychosis. This relationship deserves a
closer investigation, since the present data does not conform
to the hypothesis that LD control is helpful to psychotic
patients. The distinctive features of the LD experience in
our sample pose a challenge to the perspective of clinically
using LD for the treatment of psychosis (Dresler et al.,
2014; Voss et al., 2014). Also, the results point to an
intriguing relationship between dream lucidity and judgment
of reality among psychotic patients, which deserves deeper
investigation with larger samples. Training dream lucidity is
likely to produce safe psychological strengthening in a non-
psychotic population (Stumbrys et al., 2012), but in a psychotic
population LD practice may further empower deliria and
hallucinations, giving internal reality the appearance of external
reality.
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